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to reexamine a long-standing problem about logical inference raised by Lewis Carroll’s
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1 Introduction
Inferences are linguistic acts with a certain dynamics. In the process of making
an inference, we add premises incrementally, and revise contextual assump-
tions, often even just provisionally, to make them compatible with the premises.
Making an inference is, in this sense, moving from one set of assumptions to
another. The goal of an inference is to reach a set of assumptions that supports
the conclusion of the inference.
This essay argues from such a dynamic conception of inference to a dynamic
conception of inference rules (section §2). According to such a dynamic con-
ception, inference rules are special sorts of dynamic semantic values. Section
§3 develops this general idea into a detailed proposal and section §4 defends
it against an outstanding objection. Some of the virtues of the dynamic con-
ception of inference rules developed here are then illustrated by showing how
it helps us re-think a long-standing puzzle about logical inference, raised by
Lewis Carroll [3]’s regress (section §5).
2 From The Dynamics of Inference to A Dynamic
Conception of Inference Rules
Following a long tradition in philosophy, I will take inferences to be linguistic
acts. 2 Inferences are acts in that they are conscious, at person-level, and
1 I’d like to thank Guillermo Del Pinal, Simon Goldstein, Diego Marconi, Ram Neta,
Jim Pryor, Alex Rosenberg, Daniel Rothschild, David Sanford, Philippe Schlenker, Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong, Seth Yalcin, Jack Woods, and three anonymous referees for helpful
suggestions on earlier drafts. Special thanks go to Malte Willer and to all the organizers
of DEON 2016.
2 For example, see [6], [12], [20], [2], [21], [26], and [27], among others.
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intentional. They are linguistic, in that they consist in the utterance of a
list of sentences. These linguistic acts may be private, as when we argue to
ourselves, or public, as when we try to convince others that they should endorse
a certain conclusion through an argument. Inferences divide into inductive and
deductive inferences, but only deductive inferences are the focus here. In this
case, inferences consist in the utterance (mental or public) of a list of premises
φ1, . . . , φn and a conclusion ψ of the form pφ1, . . . , φn; therefore, ψq.
Now, as linguistic acts, inferences have a dynamic aspect. In the process
of making an inference, we add premises incrementally, and revise contextual
assumptions, often even just provisionally, to make them compatible with the
premises. For example, suppose I argue as follows:
(i) If Marco were in Italy, he would inform me;
(ii) He has not informed me;
(iii) Hence, he must not be in Italy.
In making this argument, I add premises to the set of assumptions that I and my
listeners already accept, or provisionally revise that set of assumptions in order
to make it compatible with the newly introduced premises. If my listeners and
I were previously assuming that Marco was in Italy, by uttering the premises
(i) and (ii), I am in effect asking to provisionally suspend those assumptions
from the initial set and to consider revising them in light of my argument.
Making an inference is, in this sense, moving from one set of assumptions
to another — in this case, from a set of assumptions that may or may not be
opinionated about Marco’s whereabouts — to a set of assumptions that includes
both (i) and (ii) and is adjusted for coherence. The goal of an inference is to
reach a set of assumptions that supports the conclusion of the inference — in
this case, to reach a set of assumptions that entails that Marco is not in Italy.
Nothing thus far is particularly surprising. Several have highlighted the
dynamic aspect of inferences. 3 What is less commonly explored is what this
dynamic conception of inference tells us about inference rules — such as the
rule of modus ponens or conjunction introduction.
There seems to be a natural argument from a dynamic conception of in-
ference to a dynamic conception of inference rules. The first premise is the
dynamic conception of inference:
Premise 1 An inference is a matter of moving from a set of assumptions to
another set of assumptions which is meant to license the conclusion.
Now, what is the relation between inferences dynamically conceived and in-
ference rules? Inferring is, just like asserting, a linguistic act. And just like
assertion, inferring is subject to rules or norms. Inference rules codify our in-
ferential practices along certain structural dimensions. The rules of the propo-
sitional calculus codify our inferential practices along their truth-functional
3 For example, see [29]’s notion of a reasonable inference and [39]’s notion of informational
consequence.
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dimensions, whereas the rules for the quantifiers do so along the predicative
dimension. That gives us the second premise:
Premise 2 Inference rules codify our inferences along certain structural di-
mensions.
The first and the second premise together lead us to think of the rules that
govern inferences as telling us how to update a set of assumptions in such a
way as to reach another set of assumptions that supports the conclusion:
Premise 3 Inference rules are rules to move from a set of assumptions to
another set of assumptions.
But note that, according to dynamic semantics, that is exactly what dynamic
semantic values are supposed to be ([13], [16], [17], [35], [36], and [11]). 4
Dynamic semantic values are precisely rules to update sets of assumptions and
are modeled as functions from sets of assumptions to sets of assumptions. This
modeling claim is the fourth premise:
Premise 4 Rules to update sets of assumptions can be modeled as functions
from sets of assumptions to sets of assumptions — i.e., as dynamic semantic
values.
Premise 1-Premise 4 yield the dynamic conception of inference rules:
Conclusion Inference rules can be modeled as functions from sets of assump-
tions to sets of assumptions — i.e., as dynamic semantic values. [Premise
1-Premise 4]
So, the dynamic conception of inference motivates a dynamic conception of
inference rules as dynamic semantic values. The next question is: what kinds
of dynamic semantic values? Section §3 develops the proposal in some detail.
3 Towards the proposal
3.1 Dynamic Semantics
Sets of assumptions are often referred to as contexts. A context is a set of
assumptions that are mutually shared by the participants of a conversation or
that characterize a subject’s mental state. 5 Contexts could be modeled linguis-
tically, as a set of sentences or as a set of linguistically structured propositions.
In this section, in order to flesh out my proposal in some detail, it is very con-
venient to follow Stalnaker and most dynamic semanticists in taking a context
to be a set of possible worlds — those worlds where every proposition in some
4 Other advocates of dynamic semantics are, among others, [8], [9], [38], [33], and [34].
5 [30], [31], and [32]. On modeling (private) mental states as sets of assumptions, see [40].
This notion of context is to be distinguished from another familiar notion of context, the
Kaplanian notion, on which context is whatever is relevant to fix the meaning of context-
sensitive expressions of a language. See [25], pp. 3-4 for a brief comparison of these two
notions of context.
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given set of assumptions is true. 6 In the last section, I will explain how such
a coarse-grained conception of context is not at all required by my proposal,
that can be developed also within a more fine-grained notion of context.
The dynamic semantic value of a sentence φ is a function from contexts to
contexts. More precisely, let 〈p〉 be the set of possible worlds where p — i.e.,
the set of p-worlds. The dynamic semantic value of a sentence σ — which I will
indicate by ‘[σ]’ — is a function from takes a context as argument and outputs
a context as value — i.e., ‘c[σ]’. The inductive definition is as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Dynamic Semantics)
(i) If σ has the form p, c[σ] = {w ∈ c: w ∈ 〈p〉};
(ii) If σ has the form ¬φ, c[σ] = c – c[φ];
(iii) If σ has the form φ & ψ, c[σ] = c[φ][ψ];
(iv) If σ has the form φ ∨ ψ, c[σ] = c[φ] ∪ c[¬φ][ψ].
The dynamic meaning of an atom p is the function that takes a context c into
another context c′ that includes all and only the p-worlds from c. The dynamic
meaning of a negation ¬φ is a function that takes a context c into another c′
that results from eliminating from c all the φ-worlds (= c – c[φ]). The dynamic
meaning of a conjunction φ & ψ is a function that takes a context c into the
result of updating c first with φ and then with ψ (= c[φ][ψ]). 7 The dynamic
meaning of a disjunction φ ∨ ψ is the dual of the conjunction’s dynamic meaning
(= c[φ] ∪ c[¬φ][ψ]). 8
Standard presentations of dynamic semantics define a relation of support
between contexts and sentences of our language. 9 A context c supports φ just
in case the result of updating c with φ is c itself — just in case every world in
c is a φ-world:
Definition 3.2 (Support) c supports ψ (c  φ) iff c[φ] = c.
Dynamic Entailment (DE) is instead a semantic relation holding between
sentences:
6 This idealization risks narrowing down the scope of my proposal to inferential relations
between sentences that are contingently true — and so ruling out mathematical inferences,
the sort of inferences that hold between necessarily true (or necessarily false) sentences. The
current literature discusses several ways in which one could tweak the current apparatus to
make it encompass mathematical inferences. One is to appeal to linguistically structured
contexts (see [25] for some discussion). Another is to appeal to metalinguistic propositions,
following [30]’s solution to the problem of logical omniscience. Finally, another approach,
recently explored by [24] for the specific case of mathematics, consists in adding non-linguistic
structure (in particular the structure of subject matters), to logical space and to contexts.
I will return to this issue in the last section when discussing Lewis Carroll’s regress. A
more fine-grained notion of context will turn out to be better suited to apply my proposed
conception of inference rules and inferences to Carroll’s paradox.
7 [35], p. 18.
8 See [18] and [37], p. 10 for discussion of this entry for disjunction.
9 for example, [36], p. 221-222
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Definition 3.3 (Dynamic Entailment) φ1, . . . , φn DE ψ iff ∀c: c[φ1] . . .
[φn]  ψ.
In other words, a set of sentences φ1, . . . , φn dynamically entails (DE) ψ just
in case, for every context c, the result of updating c successively with all the
premises is a context that supports ψ.
The last dynamic notion that we need is that of a test. An expression is a
test just in case its dynamic role is that of checking whether that context satisfies
certain conditions. If the context does satisfy those constraints, the test will
return the context itself; otherwise, the test will return the absurd context —
i.e., the empty set. So, for example, following Veltman ([36], p. 228), one can
think of a sentence containing an epistemic modal such as must-φ as a test
that checks whether φ is supported by the current context, in which case it
returns the context itself as value; else, it returns the absurd context (— i.e.,
the empty set):
Definition 3.4 (Example of a Test)
If σ has the form must-φ, c[σ] =
{
c if c  φ
∅ if c 2 φ
3.2 A Dynamic Conception of Inference Rules
We observed that inferences have a dynamic aspect. Here is van Benthem ([35],
p. 11) explicitly highlighting the dynamic nature of ordinary inferences:
The premises of an argument invite us to update our initial information
state, and then, the resulting transition has to be checked to see whether it
‘warrants’ the conclusion (in some suitable sense).
Following van Benthem, we can distinguish between two aspects of an inference:
(i) update: updating the initial set of assumptions;
(ii) test: checking whether the update has resulted in a set of assumptions
that ‘warrants’, or supports, the conclusion.
For example, consider the inference: pφ1, φ2, φ3; therefore, ψq. The first
three premises correspond to update: uttering them is an invitation to update
the current context sequentially with φ1, φ2, and φ3. It is, moreover, plausible
that the phrase ptherefore, ψq plays the role of the test part. As argued by
Neta ([21], p. 399), ‘therefore’ is a deictic expression in that it refers back to
the utterance of certain premises. Because of that, a dynamic interpretation
of ‘therefore’ — i.e., an interpretation that highlights the role played by the
expression within a discourse — seems to be particularly fitting. Moreover,
as famously argued by Grice [10], in a sentence such as “John is English and
therefore brave,” ‘therefore’ does not seem to add anything to the core content
of a sentence such as “John is English and brave.” The two sentences may
well have the same truth conditions, even though the former also signals (or
conventionally implies) that John’s being brave follows from his being English.
Thinking of ‘therefore’ as a test captures the Gricean insight that in some sense,
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‘therefore’ is informationally empty. A test is in a similar sense informationally
empty: its utterance does not alter the context by eliminating assumptions.
Rather, it checks that the context satisfies certain constraints. If so, the overall
meaning of a one-premise argument of the form pφ; therefore ψq can be thought
of as a function that checks whether the context created by the utterance of
the premise φ supports the conclusion ψ.
So, an inference of the form pφ1, φ2, φ3; therefore, ψq has an update part
and a test part. My proposal is that we use these two parts of an inference
to characterize both inferences and inference rules. As pointed out by Rumfitt
([27], p. 53), the horizontal line in an inference can be thought along the same
lines as the English ‘therefore’ or ‘thus’ — as a function that checks whether
the context created by the premises supports the conclusion. This leads us to
think of an inference as the composition of update and test:
φ1 , . . . , φn
ψ
}
update
test
{
This composite function will return the result of updating c successively with
the premises φ1, . . . , φn if the resulting context c
′ supports the conclusion; else
it returns the empty set (or absurd context).
This is a very natural semantic interpretation of an inference (or an ar-
gument). Along the same lines, an inference (or an argument) schema corre-
sponding to a certain inference rule can be thought of as a composite function
that takes as arguments a context and one or more sentences and returns an-
other context. Let us consider, as a first example, the rule of &-elimination,
represented here as the inference schema that takes a conjunction into either
conjunct:
φ1 & φ2
φ1, φ2
&-E
In this case, the update part is a function that takes the sentence φ1 & φ2, and
a context c, into the result of updating c with that sentence (= c[φ1 & φ2]).
Given Definition 3.1(iii), the result of so updating will be a context c′ that
results from sequentially updating c with φ1 and then φ2. The second part of
the rule is the test corresponding to the horizontal line (/) and the conclusions
φ1 and φ2 — a function that takes the sentences φ1, φ2 and a context c into c
having checked that c supports both φ1 and φ2:
Test (for &-E) c[/φ1, φ2] =
{
c if c  φ1 & c  φ2
∅ if either c 2 φ1 or c 2 φ2
It then becomes very natural to think of the &-elimination rule as the compo-
sition of these two different functions:
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Definition 3.5 (&-Elimination)
c[φ1 & φ2] ◦ [/φ1, φ2]) =
{
c[φ1 & φ2] if c[φ1 & φ2]  φ1, φ2
∅ if c[φ1 & φ2] 2 φ1, φ2
The resulting composite dynamic value will take two sentences φ1 and φ2 and
a context c and will return the result of updating c successively with φ1 and
φ2 if the new context supports both φ1 and φ2. Otherwise, it will return the
absurd context.
Let us consider a second example. Here is &-introduction:
φ1, φ2
φ1 & φ2
&-I
Taking the comma above the horizontal line to mean conjunction, we can think
of the update part of this rule as the function that, for any two sentences φ1
and φ2, takes a context c into a new context c
′ that results from updating c
successively with φ1 and then φ2:
Update (for &-I) c[φ1, φ2] = c[φ1][φ2]
The second part of the rule checks whether the resulting context supports φ1
& φ2:
Test (for &-I) c[/φ1 & φ2] =
{
c if c  φ1 & φ2
∅ if c 2 φ1 & φ2
&-introduction corresponds to the composition of these two functions: 10
Definition 3.6 (&-Introduction)
c([φ1, φ2] ◦ [/φ1 & φ2]) =
{
c[φ1][φ2] if c[φ1][φ2]  φ1 & φ2
∅ if c[φ1][φ2] 2 φ1 & φ2
In order to specify the dynamic semantic value corresponding to modus
ponens, I would have to settle the thorny issue of what the dynamic semantic
value of the English conditional is. Here, I will set for myself a much less
ambitious task, and will only consider the elimination rule for the material
conditional ‘→’: 11
10Note that although the function [φ1, φ2] will return the same value as the function
[φ1 & φ2] for any context c, the two functions are intensionally different, just like the function
‘x +1’ is different from the function ‘x + 1 + 0’, even though they will return the same value
for any argument x. By characterizing functions intensionally, rather than extensionally, on
my proposal, &-introduction is a different function from &-elimination.
11That does not mean I endorse a material conditional analysis of the indicative conditional.
I do not. Proponents of the material conditional analysis of the English indicative conditional
are, notoriously, [10], [14], [15], and [19]. Among its many detractors, see [29], [5], [1], [7],
[9], [33], and [34].
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φ φ→ ψ
ψ
MP
The update part of this rule is a function that, for any two sentences φ and
ψ, takes a context c into a context c′ that results from successively updating c
with φ and ¬φ ∨ ψ:
Update (for Modus Ponens for the Material Conditional)
c[φ, φ → ψ] = c[φ][¬φ ∨ ψ]
The composition of this update part with the test part gives us the following
composite dynamic semantic value:
Definition 3.7 (Modus Ponens for the Material Conditional)
c([φ, φ → ψ] ◦ [/ψ]) =
{
c[φ][¬φ ∨ ψ] if c[φ][¬φ ∨ ψ]  ψ
∅ if c[φ][¬φ ∨ ψ] 2 ψ
Generalizing, a rule of the following form:
φ1, ..., φn
ψ
is a function that takes sentences φ1, . . . , φ2 and ψ into the following dynamic
semantic value:
Definition 3.8 (Schema)
c([φ1, . . . , φn] ◦ [/ψ]) =
{
c[φ1][φ2]. . . [φn] if c[φ1, . . . , φn]  ψ
∅ if c[φ1, . . . , φn] 2 ψ
So we get that each instance of a rule is a dynamic semantic value. Schema
works well to characterize simple inference rules, such as the ones just consid-
ered, and can be used to capture both the rules of the propositional calculus and
those of the predicative calculus. What about meta-rules, such as conditional
proof, reductio ad absurdum, and argument by cases?
It turns out that we can model meta-rules simply by generalizing Schema
to cover a new kind of update. To see this, start by considering conditional
proof:
[φ]
....
ψ
(φ→ ψ) → I
In this schema, a sub-proof seems to play the role of the premise of the argument
schema. So the update part of this rule must consist in updating a context
with a sub-proof. But what could updating a context with a sub-proof amount
to?
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Let me make two different suggestions and let me point out one important
reason to prefer one of the two. On the first suggestion, updating a context c
with a sub-proof, say with a premise φ and conclusion ψ, updates the context
with the conditional φ → ψ:
Definition 3.9 (Update for sub-proofs I)
If σ has the form φ1, . . . , φn/ψ, c[σ] = c[(φ1 & . . . & φn) → ψ].
According to Update for sub-proofs I, the dynamic meaning of a sub-
proof like φ/ψ is the same as the dynamic meaning of the conditional φ → ψ
— their difference is merely syntactic. Observe that Update for sub-proofs
I treats the sub-proof as a real premise. For in the dynamic settings explored
here, using a sub-proof as a premise means updating the current context with
it. And note that that is exactly what Update for sub-proofs I instructs us
to do with subproofs. The main problem with this is that unless we take the
dynamic meaning of the conditional φ → ψ itself to be that given by Schema,
Update for sub-proofs I does not make clear how the dynamic meaning of
a subproof such as φ/ψ arises from the dynamic meaning of an argument from
φ to ψ, that (as we have just seen) consists in a composite function first updat-
ing the context with the premise φ and then checking whether the conclusion
ψ follows. If we want the meaning of the subproof φ/ψ to be compositional
on the meaning of the argument from φ to ψ, a better solution is to take the
dynamic meaning of the subproof φ/ψ to result from combining an instruction
to first update the context with φ and to then check whether ψ follows (just
as Schema would instruct) with an instruction to discharge the assumption φ.
The upshot of this composite instruction is the same as that of a test — an
instruction to return to the context c having checked that c[φ] supports ψ: 12
Definition 3.10 (Update for sub-proofs II)
If σ has the form φ1, . . . , φn/ψ, c[σ] = {w ∈ c: c[φ1 & . . . & φn]  ψ}.
We will see in the last section another conceptual advantage of this second
option. For now simply note that both Update for sub-proofs I and Update
for sub-proofs II allow us to think of Conditional Proof along the exact same
lines as our previous rules —i.e., as the following composite function:
Definition 3.11 (Conditional Proof)
c([φ/ψ] ◦ [/φ → ψ]) =
{
c[φ/ψ] if c[φ/ψ]  φ → ψ
∅ if c[φ/ψ] 2 φ → ψ
The discussion of Conditional Proof also covers also Reductio ad Ab-
surdum, for such a rule can be thought as a special instance of Conditional
12Accordingly, the subproof pφ/ψq represents the combination of the argument from φ to ψ
with the further instruction to discharge the premise φ. Plausibly, the latter instruction to
discharge premise φ is expressed by the ending of the sub-proof line.
212 Logical Inference and Its Dynamics
Proof, where ¬A = A → ⊥. Finally, consider Argument by Cases:
φ1 ∨ φ2
[φ1]....
ψ
[φ2]....
ψ
ψ
Here, we have three different premises — a sentence φ1 ∨ φ2 as well as the sub-
proofs φ1/ψ and φ2/ψ. Treating each as an individual premise, the update part
of this rule will update the context sequentially with φ1 ∨ φ2, φ1/ψ, and φ2/ψ.
Just like in the previous case of Conditional Proof, this update allows us to
define the rule of Argument by Cases as one would expect, given our previous
discussion (where c∗ = c[φ1 ∨ φ2][φ1/ψ][φ2/ψ]):
Definition 3.12 (Argument by Cases)
c([φ1 ∨ φ2, φ1/ψ, φ2/ψ] ◦ [/ψ]) =
{
c∗ if c∗  ψ
∅ if c∗ 2 ψ
We are now in position to generalize the original Schema to encompass
the case of meta-rules. The only difference with respect to Schema is that the
first function can now take as arguments not just sentences φ1, . . . , φn but any
environment above the horizontal line, including sub-proofs. Hence, by letting
P (for premise) vary over both sentences and sub-proofs and by letting C vary
over conclusions, we arrive at:
Definition 3.13 (Schema-General)
c([P1, . . . , Pn] ◦ [/C]) =
{
c[P1][P2]. . . [Pn] if c[P1, . . . , Pn]  C
∅ if c[P1, . . . , Pn] 2 C
The structure of the premises together with Schema-General gives us
a general recipe to map any schema into the corresponding context-change
potential. Note also that the assignment of dynamic semantic values to schemas
is compositional, as it is entirely determined by the meanings of their parts,
together with the syntax of the schemas (the order and the syntax of their
premises, the horizontal line, and the syntax of their conclusion).
4 Classical versus Dynamic Validity
On the current approach, an inferential rule is valid (0) just in case the relevant
composite function never returns the empty set for any context:
Definition 4.1 P1, . . . , Pn 0 C iff for every c: c([P1, . . . , Pn] ◦ [/C]) 6= ∅.
It is straightforward to prove that an inference rule is valid (0) just in case it
is DE-valid (DE):
Theorem 4.2 P1, . . . , Pn 0 C iff P1, . . . , Pn DE C.
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Proof. Suppose P1, . . . , Pn 0 C. Then, by Definition 4.1, for every c:
c([P1, . . . , Pn] ◦ [/C]) 6= ∅. But then, by Definition 3.13, for every c:
c[P1, . . . , Pn]  C. Hence, by Definition 3.3, P1, . . . , Pn DE C. Now, sup-
pose P1, . . . , Pn DE C. Then, by Definition 3.3, for every c: c[P1, . . . , Pn]
 C. Then, by Definition 3.13, for every c: c([P1, . . . , Pn] ◦ [/C]) 6= ∅. Then,
by Definition 4.1, P1, . . . , Pn 0 C. 2
A possible objection is that this notion of validity (0) conflates two notions
of validity: classical validity and dynamic validity. As observed by van Benthem
([35], p. 11 and pp. 18-19), these are indeed different notions of validity.
For dynamic validity, the order of the premises and the multiplicity of their
occurrence matter. That seems to clash with the basic structural rules of
standard classical logic.
Can this important distinction between dynamic validity and classical va-
lidity be vindicated on the present approach? As Starr ([33], p. 9) has pointed
out, classical entailment can be thought of as a special case of dynamic entail-
ment — i.e., as dynamic entailment in contexts of perfect information. Contexts
of perfect information only include the world of the context — no other world is
compatible with a set of propositions that completely distinguishes the actual
world from any other possible worlds. So, let the context of perfect informa-
tion relative to w be {w}. Classical entailment (CE) emerges by focusing on
perfect information:
Definition 4.3 P1, . . . , Pn CE C iff ∀{w}: {w}[P1] . . . [Pn]  C.
Call a function from contexts of perfect information to other contexts of
perfect information a limiting dynamic semantic value. The limiting dynamic
semantic value of a schema is insensitive to the order of its premises. So when
we want to highlight the insensitivity of classical structural rules to the order
of their premises, we can then think of them as limiting dynamic semantic
values. This move preserves van Benthem’s distinction, while clinging to the
idea according to which classical inference rules are sorts of dynamic semantic
values.
5 The Dynamic Conception of Inference Rule and Lewis
Carroll’s Regress
What does it mean to follow a rule in an argument? According to a very
popular diagnosis of Carroll’s regress of the premises, following a rule in an
argument is not the same as using, or being guided by, a logical truth. The
argument to this conclusion goes as follows. Let us start with premises A and
if A then B:
(i) A.
(ii) If A then B.
How does one get from these premises to the conclusion B? Presumably, by
appeal to modus ponens. But now, suppose the rule of modus ponens were
identical to the general principle LT-mp:
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LT-mp For every X, Y, if X and if X then Y, then Y.
or to the conditional schema:
LT-mp-schema If X and if X then Y, then Y.
Then, presumably, following that rule would be a matter of instantiating
LT-mp or LT-mp-schema for the particular case of A and B — adding an
instance of theirs as premise. But by instantiating such a logical truth, one
only gets to (iii), still short of the conclusion B:
(i) A.
(ii) If A then B.
(iii) If A and if A then B then B.
How can one get from (i-iii) to the conclusion? Again, by appeal to modus
ponens, one would guess. The problem is that if following modus ponens is the
same thing as using LT-mp or LT-mp-schema, then arguing by modus ponens
must amount to instantiating either for the particular cases of the premises.
But by so doing, one will only get to the following four-premise argument (by
taking the conjunction of A and If A then B as the first premise, and (iii) as
the second premise), and still short of the conclusion B. And so on. Therefore,
if following modus ponens were the same as using a general principle such as
LT-mp or a conditional schema such as LT-mp-schema in the course of an
argument, following a rule would trigger a regress, making it impossible to reach
a conclusion. But we do routinely succeed at reasoning by modus ponens. So,
the argument concludes that following modus ponens cannot be the same as
using LT-mp or LT-mp-schema:
Diagnosis Following an inference rule in the course of an argument is not the
same as using a logical truth.
And from Diagnosis, it is a shot step to conclude to:
Rules versus logical truths An inference rule is not the same as a logical
truth.
This step is motivated by the thought that the only ways a truth can be used
in an argument are by instantiation (if the logical truth is general, such as
LT-mp) or by iteration (if the logical truth is singular such as the conditional
‘If A, and if A then B, then B ’ or an instance of the conditional schema LT-
mp-schema). This is plausibly a general claim about truths. This claim is
not irresistible but to resist it is not an easy task: defending it would require
providing a different model of how truths can be used in the course of an
argument, one that to my knowledge nobody has ever provided.
It should not come as a surprise, then, that many have underwritten Rules
versus logical truths as the correct diagnosis of the regress. For example,
Dummett [4], p. 303, observes that the main moral of the regress is that an
argument of the form:
(A) Pietro is Italian; if Pietro is Italian then Andrea is Italian; therefore
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Andrea is Italian.
cannot be identified with the conditional statement:
(C) If both Pietro is Italian and if Pietro is Italian, then Andrea is Italian,
then Andrea is Italian.
Along similar lines, Ryle ([28], p. 7) argues that knowing a rule is not the same
as knowing a truth. Finally, Rumfitt ([26], p. 358) argues that knowledge of a
logical truth cannot explain our ability to make deductions and takes that to
be the moral of Lewis Carroll’s fable.
Although very popular, it should be emphasized that Rules versus logical
truths is entirely negative: it only tells us that rules are not logical truths but
it does not tell us what rules are. A solution to the puzzle raised by the
regress requires replacing a conception of inference rules as logical truths with
something else.
The dynamic notion of inference rules I developed in §3 offers a suitable
semantic replacement of the notion of rule as logical truth. To see this point, it
is now convenient to shift from the coarse-grained notion of context employed
so far to a more fine-grained notion of context, as a set of structured proposi-
tions. On such a fine-grained notion of context, it makes sense to think of our
using a logical truth in the course of an argument as a matter of adding it to
the context as a further premise. 13 But now suppose inference rules are not
logical truths but dynamic semantic values of the sort that I described in the
last section. Following an inference rule in this sense is not a matter of adding
a logical truth to the context as a further premise. Rather, it is a matter of
implementing a particular function and, in particular, one whose implementa-
tion does not require to go through instantiation of the rule itself as an extra
premise. To see this, consider Modus Ponens for the Material Condi-
tional (Definition 3.7). Such rule is a function that, given the premises and
a context as arguments, updates the context with the premises, having checked
that the result supports the conclusion. So the use of this rule — i.e., the
implementation of this function — does not require adding the rule itself to
the context nor does it require instantiating the rule itself as an extra-premise.
Relatedly, my proposal, coupled with a suitably fine-grained notion of con-
text, also helps us appreciate Dummett’s distinction between an argument such
as (A) and a conditional such as (C). Whereas using a conditional such as (C)
in the course of an argument plausibly does require to add to the context (C)
as an extra premise, on my proposal, using an argument such as (A) does not
require to add to the context (A) itself as an extra premise. Here, one might
object that arguments do sometimes appear to be treated as premises, as when
13Adopting a more fine-grained notion of context makes it easier to appreciate the difference
that my proposal draws between, on one hand, using a logical truth in the course of an
argument and, on the other, following a rule in the sense of ‘rule’ here outlined. By contrast,
on a coarse-grained conception of context as set of possible worlds, updating a logical truth
(a necessary truth) in the course of an argument is an ineffectual update — for it does not
eliminate any possible world.
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we argue by conditional proof. But recall that, even when arguments are ap-
parently used as premises in arguments by conditional proof or by argument
by cases, my Update for Sub-Proofs II does not take them to work as real
premises. Rather, according to Update for Sub-Proofs II, their role as sub-
proofs is equivalent to that of a test — an instruction to first check that the
context created by adding their premises supports the conclusion and to then
return to the original context after the checking.
Note that my claim is not that the implementation of a context-change
potential never requires adding an extra premise. To see this, consider the
following universal principle:
LT-mp-dynamic For every X, Y, if X and if X then Y, then must-Y.
On its dynamic interpretation, LT-mp-dynamic also expresses a dynamic se-
mantic value. But the relevant context-change potential is different from the
one defined in Definition 3.7, for LT-mp-dynamic is a universal claim. So
LT-mp-dynamic’s dynamic meaning is function also of the dynamic mean-
ing of the universal quantifier. Assuming a certain dynamic treatment of the
universal quantifier and a suitably fine-grained notion of context, its dynamic
meaning will consist in an update — in adding it (or an instance of it) as
a premise to the context. So while implementing the function corresponding
Definition 3.7 does not require instantiating extra premises, implementing
the function corresponding to LT-mp-dynamic does (plausibly) require go-
ing through instantiation for possible assignments to X and Y.
What should we conclude? The conclusion to draw is that also LT-mp-
dynamic is not the right way to think of the inference rule of modus ponens. Of
course, it does not follow that my proposal is not correct, for as I just observed,
on my proposal modus ponens is not the same as the dynamic interpretation of
LT-mp-dynamic just mentioned. My claim is that certain dynamic semantic
values (the ones described in section §3) can stop the regress. My claim is not
that every possible dynamic semantic value will block the regress.
Here is a second potential worry. Could not we imagine a ‘dynamic’ ver-
sion of the regress, on which a subject keeps updating the context with more
premises, without being able to run a test? If so, how does the dynamic con-
ception of inference rules improve on a conception of rules as logical truths?
In response, let me note that the current proposal offers an account of rule-
following on which, if one can follow a rule at all, one could not get stuck in the
regress of the premises. It is worth going through this point carefully. On the
current proposal, a subject who keeps updating the context with more premises
without being able to run a test would prove to be unable to follow the relevant
rule. That is so because on the current proposal, following an inference rule
requires being able to run a test. That can be seen from the fact that running a
test is a condition for implementing the composite functions with which I have
identified inference rules (which are composed both of an update part and a
test part). Hence, if one can follow a rule at all in this sense, one simply can-
not get stuck with the regress of the premises. By contrast, if rules are logical
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truths, following a rule will get us stuck in the regress of the premises. Whereas
the notion of following a logical truth is regress-triggering and hence paradoxi-
cal, the notion of following a rule developed here is not. That is the important
respect under which the dynamic conception of inference rules improves on a
conception of rules as logical truths.
6 Conclusions
The dynamic conception of inference rules developed in this essay provides a
picture of rule-following which blocks Carroll’s regress. As argued in §2, such
a dynamic conception is independently motivated by a dynamic conception of
inference. As shown in §3, it arises from a plausible and compositional assign-
ment of meanings to argument schemas and from an independently motivated
dynamic interpretation of the horizontal line and of the English ‘therefore’.
Because of that, it captures the distinction Dummett seemed to be after in the
passage mentioned: that between an argument of the form pP; if P then Q;
therefore, Qq and a conditional of the form pif P, and if P then Q, then Qq.
All in all, the dynamic conception of inference rules seems to provide a suitably
semantic replacement of a conception of inference rules as logical truths.
Some outstanding issues are left open by this essay, that I do not have the
space to discuss here (though see [22] for discussion). The first is: how does the
dynamic conception of inference rules compare to other conceptions of inferen-
tial rules, for example, as syntactic mappings or conditional recommendations
of sort? Whether or not these conceptions of inference rules can block Carroll’s
regress, I argue elsewhere that they all fall short in other respects ([22]). Ei-
ther they do not correspond to a plausible interpretation of argument schemas
and/or they are not suitably semantic conceptions of inference rules, and be-
cause of that, they face a version or another of a problem that I call the problem
of understanding. If I am right, a stronger case on behalf of my proposal is
available than I can make here.
The second outstanding issue is this. On the dynamic conception of infer-
ence rules, being competent with an inference rule is a matter of being compe-
tent with a function. As I argue elsewhere ([23], [22]), being competent with
a function plausibly requires the function being representable by a subject in
terms of operations that the subject can already perform. 14 So if inference
rules are dynamically conceived, our being competent with inference rules re-
quires these functions being representable by us in terms of operations that
are performable by us — by individuals of average linguistic competence. How
plausible is this claim? Although the issue is of great importance, it is not
specific to my dynamic conception of inference rules. It arises for any appeal
to dynamic semantics as an explanatory theory of our linguistic competence,
for on the dynamic picture, knowledge of meanings is in general a matter of
being competent with functions. Hence, although a thorough defense of the
dynamic conception of inference rules does require a detailed defense of the
14By analogy with the notion of primitive recursive function in computability theory.
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plausibility of this claim, I consider it to be part of a bigger project that will
have to be discussed in further work.
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